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BREACH OF CRIMINAL LICENSING STATUTES IN
CIVIL LITIGATION
Charles 0. Gregory*
I.
One of the important bases of civil liability in our times is the violation
of criminal statutes. This is so, in spite of the fact that most of these
statutes make no provision at all for civil liability. There are literally
hundreds of statutes on our books obviously intended to prevent the
occurrence of specific extra-hazardous conduct. While most of them
. simply forbid the conduct in question or make it punishable by fine,
at least when it is done in certain areas and under certain conditions,1
some of them expressly include provisions attaching civil liability for
damage caused by their breach. A few state that engaging in certain
conduct, without observance of the conditions specified, amounts to
the commission of a nuisance 2-- apparently implying that liability will
automatically follow for damage occurring when these conditions have
been ignored. Indeed, it seems to be an equally fair implication from
such statutes that damage occurring when the stipulated conditions have
been observed is not actionable in the absence of negligenceY In addition to these, there are, of course, other statutes which do not forbid
engaging in any conduct at all but simply impose liability for all harm
caused by engaging in certain conduct or by certain hazards connected
with such conduct, regardless of the absence of fault. 4
This brief article is intended to deal only with statutes whose breach,
whether correctly or incorrectly, is analogized to negligence, with particular emphasis on violations of licensing statutes. Everyone is familiar
with the leading cases in this general field and with the outstanding
articles by Thayer, Lowndes and Morris, dealing with this subject.,
While a great debt is due the learned authors for much that is helpful
in their treatments, it can be said that they have placed insufficient
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page 688, for biographical data.
1 E.g., VT. Pua. LAWS § 8724 (1933), as to which see also Exner v. Sherman Power
Construction Co., 54 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
2 CALIF. PUBLIC RESOURCES CODE C. 3, § 3600 (Deering 1939), passed apparently as a
sequel to Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
3 See Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., 54 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
4 E.g., Orro GEr. CODE ANN. § 8970 (1938).
.5 Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, SELECTED EssAYs ON TnE LAW OF TORTS
276 (1924), originally appearing in 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914) ; Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MNr. L. Rav. 361 (1932); Morris, Relation of
Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933); Morris, The Role of
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COL. L. REv. 21 (1949).
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analytical emphasis on the breach of licensing statutes. Indeed, it is
the analysis of this aspect of the subject in general which affords most
handily a perspective on the proper use of violations of criminal statutes
as the basis of civil liability in tort.
The present author has always felt that it is a great mistake to
consider at all the breach of a criminal statute in imposing civil liability
in tort, unless the statute expressly provides for such liability. The
only excuse for proceeding contrariwise is that a refusal to do so occasionally creates a paradoxical situation which is impossible to reconcile
-with the general principles of the law of negligence. In order to avoid
any such paradox, therefore, the author rather reluctantly concedes that
it sometimes becomes absolutely necessary to regard the breach of a
criminal statute as a basis of civil liability. What is referred to, of
course, are statutes which establish a standard of care for more or less
routine conduct-what might be called "safety statutes."
In administering the law of negligence we use the "reasonable and
prudent man" standard to guide the trial court in its determinations of
whether or not to submit certain cases to the jury. Such cases as are
submitted to the jury are accompanied by charges exhorting the jurors
to consider the evidence concerning the negligence issue on the basis
of the same standard. Indeed, when the only issue before an appellate
court is whether or not the trial court was right in submitting the case
to the jury at all on the basis of the evidence of negligence adduced,
the appellate court must also seek recourse to this standard. In each
instance a process of evaluating human conduct occurs. That evaluation
is conducted on the basis of familiarity with more or less normal human
experience. The trial judge refuses to let the case go to the jury at all if,
in his opinion, twelve laymen could not reasonably disagree among
themselves that the defendant's conduct was not negligent. When the
plaintiff assigns as error on appeal the trial court's direction of a verdict
for the defendant on this ground, the appellate court has to go through
the same process of evaluating human conduct on the basis of their
notions (quite often vicarious) of human experience.' If they allow
the appeal, it is because they disagree with the trial court's evaluating
process. And the same phenomenon is involved if the trial court does
let the case go to the jury and the defendant appeals from judgment
entered on the verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that it was error
to submit the question of negligence to the jury in the first place. Here,
often enough, the appellate court may agree with the defendant that
no jury of laymen could reasonably infer that.the conduct in issue was
6 See opinion of'Palles, C. B., in Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2 Ir. R. 317.
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negligence; and if it does so, it reverses the trial court with an order
to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Some very amusing cases have arisen in this connection, one of the
most striking of which is Bennett v. Illinois P. & L. Corp.7 There a
power company had been stretching wire along a road and had left a
huge wire spool standing alongside the roadway, just off the line of
travel. Plaintiff's horse was frightened by the spool and ran away, the
plaintiff sustaining damage as a consequence. The only issue involved
was whether or not the defendant had been negligent in leaving the spool
where it was. The trial court apparently thought a jury of laymen
might reasonably so conclude and let the case go to the jury, which
brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment being entered thereon.
At any rate, the case was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court of
Illinois, its 4-3 decision holding that the case was improperly submitted
to the jury. Of course, this seems ridiculous at first blush, for if three
out of seven state supreme court judges are of the belief that a jury
of laymen might reasonably draw the inference that the defendant had
been negligent, then one would suppose off hand that the matter was
properly left to the jury in the first place.
But that is not true at all. Paradoxical as this decision may seem,
it is absolutely defensible.' The state supreme court is not acting as a
jury of laymen. It is, rather, making the last guess on whether or not
the evidence of alleged negligence would justify the inference by a
group of laymen that the defendant's conduct actually had amounted to
negligence or, put another way, of whether or not a group of laymen
could reasonably differ among themselves over this same matter. This
guess is a terribly important judicial function-of the very essence of
the administration of the law of negligence. Indeed, the determination
of this issue at the judicial stage is usually called an "issue of law,"
although a little clear thinking will reveal that it is simply an evaluation
process no different from that which the jury indulges in when it is
permitted to do so. What really distinguishes the judicial function in
dealing with the simple negligence issue is the realization that it is not
safe to let all simple negligence capes go to the jury because of the
realization that jurors' collective reactions are apt to be based on such
psychological factors as sympathy, the color of the female plaintiff's
hair, the fact that the defendant is a "big corporation," and the like.
Only when the "professionals" involved believe that the evidence ad7 Bennett v. Illinois P. & L. Corp., 355 Ill. 564, 189 N. E. 899 (1934).

8 See Seader v. City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 369, 54 A. 2d 701 (1947), noted in 9 U. or
Prrr. L. REV. 139 (1947) ; Ferguson v. Seattle, 27 Wash. 2d 55, 176 P. 2d 445 (1947).
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duced could reasonably support the inference' of negligence (regardless
of what ultimate inference these "professionals" themselves might draw,
were they sitting on the case without a jury) should they let the case
be finally disposed of by the "tyros." Then whatever the jury doesand for whatever reasons-the judges can salve their consciences with
the knowledge that the evidence could reasonably be interpreted to support the inference of either negligence or no negligence.
In the Bennett case the four judges constituting the majority of the
Illinois Supreme Court apparently were convinced that a miscarriage
of justice would occur if a jury were permitted to conclude that the
defendant's conduct in that case was actionable negligence. Another
way of saying this is that they were convinced, as professional and
experienced jurists, that the defendant's conduct was not sub-standard
conduct and that no group of laymen in the jury-box should be permitted to conclude otherwise. The three dissenting judges differed
from them in only this respect-that, on the basis of their professional
experience and observations, this conclusion was not so obvious. Their
dissent did not necessarily mean that if they had been in the jury-box,
or if they were acting as judges without a jury, they would have drawn
the inference that the defendant was negligent. Far from it. All they
meant was that they, as professional jurists, could not be sure that the
inference of negligence would be unreasonable. Here was an honest
difference of opinion among the professionals of last resort, distinguishable from the 5-4 decisions of the United States Supreme Court only by
the fact that this evaluation process occurred at a relatively uncomplicated and lowly level-one not charged with grave social and political
considerations.
II.
What has the foregoing discussion got to do with the breach of
criminal statutes as the basis of civil liability? It has plenty to do witn
it, because it sets forth the only area of civil litigation in which criminal
statutes should have any bearing whatsoever, at least when such statutes do not specifically provide for civil liability. It is only when a
criminal statute provides a standard of conduct-a way of doing what
the defendant did or failed to do in any particular case in questionthat a court should permit its breach to be considered as a basis of
civil liability at all. Indeed, one might go further and say that in such
an instance, the court must take the breach of statute into account,
because to do otherwise would involve the litigation in hopeless contradictions of principle under our established law of negligence. Again
(repeating the caveat once and for all), always assuming that what is
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said here applies only to criminal statutes which do not contain specific
provisions allowing for civil liability.
The best illustration of what is meant can be shown by reference to
a leading case in this field. 9 A state statute required druggists who sold
poisonous drugs in bottles to place thereon labels containing the word
"Poison" and showing the symbol of a skull and cross-bones. Because
the defendant druggist failed to comply with this statute, the plaintiff's
intestate ingested some of the unlabelled poisonous drug, confusing it
with some innocuous medicine he intended to take, and died as a result.
In his action against the druggist, the plaintiff assigned the defendant's
breach of the criminal statute as the basis of civil liability. The Minnesota court made it clear that this was an ordinary negligence action
and not an action authorized by statute or based in any way on the
statute so as to make it other than a simple common-law action. It did
say-rather unfortunately-that the statute, instead of the common law,
fixed "the measure of legal duty." Had it left the matter there, the
court would have introduced an element of confusion which would be
most misleading, for the factor of duty in negligence litigation is certainly not involved in these breach of statute cases. Fortunately it
transpires that all the court meant by the term "duty" was that duty
of care of which negligence is so frequently said to be the breach. Those
of us who realize that defining negligence as the breach of a duty of
care is a futile and meaningless verbalism, are not seriously upset by
this usage."°
But the Minnesota court then made it clear that the only real difference between the druggist's case as it actually came up, and what it
would have been in the absence of the statute, was the source of the
standard of care to be employed in determining whether or not the
defendant's omission was sub-standard or negligent. In either event,
the plaintiff's action would be a simple, common-law negligence action,
in the one case the standard of evaluating the defendant's conduct being
the statute with its legislative standard, and in the other, the commonlaw standard of the reasonable and prudent man, with all that that
loose standard implies. As the court put it, defendant's non-compliance
with the statutory standard was negligence per se; and we all know that
in the absence of the statute, the same conduct would very likely have
required the verdict of a jury in order to be labelled negligent, with
the additional possibility that the trial court might (1) have directed a
9 Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103 (1889).
10 Terry, Negligence, SELECTED ESSAYS ON T=
appearing in 29 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1915).

LAW o

TORTS 261 (1924), originally
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verdict for defendant on the grounds that there was no evidence of
negligence, (2) have set aside a verdict for defendant as contrary to the
weight of the evidence and directed one for the plaintiff, or (3) have
entered judgment on the jury's verdict for the defendant.
The statute in this case changes the situation entirely. Here the
court is virtually obliged to use the breach of statute as the basis of
civil liability. For whether or not the druggist was negligent depends
upon whether or not his conduct came up to the prevailing standard of
care under the circumstances. Now, if the court ignores the statute,
then due care under the circumstances can be determined only by recourse to the evaluating process discussed above, where the court and
jury cooperate in setting the standard on the basis of normal community
conduct and adjudge the defendant's behavior accordingly. The result
of such a process may be the conclusion that the conduct in question
was not sub-standard or negligent; and in a similar case thereafter,
another jury might conclude otherwise or, for that matter, reach the
same conclusion. Moreover, how the same or different trial judges might
react to these verdicts is anybody's guess. But such a situation is an
absurd paradox, where the conduct in question has already been officially
declared sub-standard and criminal by the highest legal agency in the
state. Under such circumstances there is not only no need to resort to
the common-law evaluating process but there is a compelling reason
for not doing so-that is, that the court or the jury might set another
standard in conflict with that already set by the legislature. 1 ' This picture of a common jury competing successfully with the legislature, in
establishing the prevailing norm of approved conduct is, of course, too
ridiculous to be tolerated. Hence, if the evidence indicates that the
druggist violated the statute and that such violation was the cause of
the harm in suit, then the druggist is negligent and, if a causal connection is shown, liable.
However, the whole matter is not quite as simple as this, although
the druggist case discussed above is hardly more complicated. Theoretically, in every case where breach of a criminal statute is assigned
as the equivalent of negligence in a civil action for damages, there are
other inquiries to make before one can be sure that consideration of
the breach of statute is appropriate at all. After it is agreed that the
statute is a safety statute-one which sets a standard way of doing a
certain thing or which forbids the doing of something in a certain waythe court must make certain determinations. First, it must ascertain
what the purpose of the statute is-what the legislature "intended"
11 Thayer, supra note 5, at 281.
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when it passed the act. What risk or hazard was it trying to avoid?
Suppose it declared that sheep may not be freighted on board a ship
unless they are put into small pens, say, six in each. A shipping line
ignores this statute, so that, when the ship wallows in a stormy sea,
the sheep are hurled the breadth of the boat, from one side to the other
and back, to their damage. Observance of the statute would have prevented this. But it is well-understood that the purpose of the statute
was to prevent the spread of disease throughout the entire flock.'" Thus,
if a disease broke out among those in one pen, they could be isolated
or destroyed and the balance of the sheep might be saved. Since the
hazard against which the statute was enacted is not the one which ensued, breach of the statute becomes immaterial and the shipping company's conduct can be held negligent, if at all, only in accordance with
the common-law standard. In the druggist case discussed above, however, the hazard which ensued was obviously the one which the legislature had hoped to prevent by observance of the statute.
Second, the court must ascertain what interest the legislature intended
to protect-whom it proposed to benefit, in what way-by observance
of the statute. This is a double-barrelled inquiry. Some statutes have
been held to have been passed for the benefit of the public in general
and not for the benefit of particular individuals. The classical instance
is the statute requiring adjacent landowners to shovel the ice and snow
off the public sidewalks in front of their houses and stores. 13 Persons
who have been hurt through non-observance of such statutes have been
told that these acts were not passed for their benefit but were designed
to relieve the public treasury from the expense of removing the ice and
snow. A more understandable illustration--one unfortunately not involving the occurrence of inadvertent harm and, hence, not really appropriate in a discussion of negligence per se-appears in connection with
statutory rape and abortion. A statute declares that a girl under 18
cannot consent to sexual intercourse. One who nevertheless does so may
turn around and recover damages against her seducer, free from the
defense of consent. But if the same girl had become pregnant and had
been persuaded by her seducer to undergo an abortion, illegal by statute,
she could not recover damages for the battery involved in an action
against her seducer and the doctor. While the former statute was for
her benefit, the latter was passed out of deference to the public's interest
14
in the future of the race.
12

Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch. 125 (1874).

13 See Thayer, supra note 5, at 288. See also Kirby v. Boylston Market, 80 Mass. 249

(1860).
14 Herman v. Turner, 117 Kan. 733, 232 Pac. 864 (1925).
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Another example of the interest to be protected occurs in connection
with statutes requiring railroads to fence their rights of way in rural
districts. The purpose of such statutes is generally conceded to be to
protect the interest of adjacent farmers' cattle and horses-to keep them
from being run down. Where the absence of such a statutory fence
was shown to have resulted in the death of a farmer's small son, who
crawled onto the tracks and was hit, the New York court held that the
plaintiff could not rely on the breach of statute as a basis of liability.'"
The reason it gave was that the legislature had intended to pr6tect only
the adjacent property owners' interest in live stock and not human personality interests.
What the court would have done had the farmer's son been hit while
he was trying to drive cows off the railroad tracks remains a matter of
conjecture, as to which interesting speculations might be raised on the
basis of Cardozo's opinion in De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co.'There he stated that the legislative purpose underlying a criminal safety
statute may be determined not alone on the basis of what precise hazard
the legislature actually had in mind to avoid but also on the basis of
what the court believes it might have intended had the particular situation which arose been called to its attention. He was dealing with a
statute which prohibited leaving unfenced work elevators on construction jobs, the legislature having intended thereby to avoid the hazard of
workmen falling down the shafts. But in the case before the court a
steam radiator, left near the edge of the shaft because of the absence
of the statutory fence, fell down and hit a workman ascending in the
elevator. Cardozo declared that had this hazard been called to its attention, the legislature would surely have agreed that it was also within
the scope of the statutory rule of protection. Hence, a court should
liberally interpret the legislative intent to make it include the avoidance
of situations not specifically foreseen but closely allied to those which
the legislature had actually intended to cover.
In any event, after the court is satisfied that the statute is a safety
measure designed to prevent the hazard which occurred and to protect
the interest affected from the damage sustained, it must be satisfied that
there is evidence indicating that the breach of statute is a causal factor
in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. While this matter of causal connection is exceedingly simple, many courts have introduced needless
complications in handling it. Thus, they have kept cases from the jury
by declaring that the breach of statute was a mere "condition" and not
15 Di Caprio v. New York Central Ry., 231 N. Y. 194, 131 N. E. 746 (1921).
16 258 N. Y. 350, 179 N. E. 764 (1932).
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a "cause" of the plaintiff's damage, when proper analysis reveals no
justification for using, the language of cause at all. An instance is the
breach of a parking statute, where defendant left his car parked in a
certain place beyond the time allowed and plaintiff non-negligently
collided with it." The proper answer to the plaintiff is that if defendant's
car were not there at the time, someone else's car might lawfully have
been there, and that the purpose of. the statute was not to keep open
the spot in question but merely to serve the convenience of other wouldbe parkers of automobiles. The same is true of cases where a train
remains on a railroad crossing beyond the statutory time. The purpose
of that statute is not to prevent collisions with the train by automobiles
approaching the crossing but is to prevent delays caused to automobilists
using the road, although conceivably it might be held to mean the avoidance of the normal incidence of congested road8 traffic, including collisions between automobiles resulting therefrom.1
III.

Certainly enough has been said to reveal the part ordinarily played
by the breach of criminal safety statutes in civil negligence litigation. At
this time let us shift attention to a particular type of criminal statutethose imposing a penalty for engaging in certain conduct without a license
to do so, although not at the same time expressly providing for a civil
action for damages occurring during the course of the unlicensed activity.
One of the most important of these cases is Brown v. Shyne.'0 There
a New York statute made it a misdemeanor to practice medicine without a license; but it made no provision for civil actions against those
who violated the statute. The defendant, who was unlicensed to practice medicine, gave the plaintiff chiropractic treatment and the plaintiff
sustained harm as a consequence. In her suit for damages against the
defendant the case was submitted to the jury on two theories-one for
negligence amounting to ordinary malpractice and the other for negligence arising from breach of the statute, the trial court instructing the
jury that it could regard the fact that defendant was unlicensed as
evidence of negligence. From a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff
the defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, through Judge Lehman, held that the instruc37

Falk v. Finkelman, 268 Mass. 524, 168 N. E. 89 (1929).

18 Compare Patterson v. Detroit, L. & N. R.R., 56 Mich. 172

(1885)

and Hendley v.

Chicago & N. W. Ry., 198 Wis. 569, 225 N. W. 205 (1929). See also Missouri, K. & T.
R.R. v. McLain, 74 S. W. 2d 166 (Tex. 1934), with which compare Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Huss, 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N. E. 919 (1932).
19 Brown v. Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 151 N. E. 197 (1926).
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tion, based on the breach of the licensing statute, was reversible error,
Judge Crane vigorously dissenting. Judge Lehman observed that the
jury's verdict was consistent with the finding that breach of the licensing
statute was the sole evidence of negligence. Furthermore, he did not
think that there was any logical connection between the failure to have
a license and the malpractice alleged, any more than the having of a
license would serve as proof that there had been no negligence at all.
As an additional reason for the majority decision, Judge Lehman pointed
out that the licensing statute was a measure enacted for the benefit of
the public at large and was not passed for the protection of individual
interests against any particular hazards.
Judge Lehman did not comment on the fact that the trial court had
talked about breach of the statute as merely evidence of negligenceno doubt because he regarded any mention at all of this particular
statute as incorrect in a civil action. However, it should be mentioned
in passing that whenever a breach of criminal statute is appropriately
used as the basis of liability in a civil action, then breach of that statute
should be regarded as negligence per se-in itself-and not merely as
evidence of negligence. For if it is regarded as merely evidence, then
the jury is placed in a position to conclude that conduct which the legislature has officially declared to be substandard is, in the jury's opinion,
not substandard at all. In other words, if any inference' of negligence
is to be drawn from the breach of a criminal statute, it must be a compulsory-and not merely a permissible-inference. Additional comment
seems necessary on Judge Lehman's conclusion that this licensing statute
was one passed for the protection of the general public as a whole against
the likelihood of incompetent practitioners and was not one enacted for
the protection of individual personal interests. It is difficult to understand how he reached this conclusion. One might suspect that it was
reached after the appellate judges first decided that breach of this
statute was not a factor to be considered in a civil action. At any rate,
there is certainly a safer and more certain way of analyzing the situation than to proceed in this way on the basis of so-called "legislative
intent."'O For at this stage of the reasoning Judge Crane's remarks
in his dissent seem quite as acceptable as those in the majority opinion,
whereas the proper analysis furnishes a complete answer to the sentiments of the dissenting judge.
The real reason that the licensing statute in question cannot operate
in any Way as the basis of civil liability is that it establishes no standard
of conduct-it does not stipulate that any particular human act, let
20 As to this phrase, see Lowndes, supra note 5, at 362.
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alone anything which the defendant happened to do in practicing on
the person of the plaintiff, must be done in any prescribed fashion.
Hence, in the absence of any provision in the act to the effect that its
breach will give rise to a civil action for damages, there is nothing to
operate as a legislatively imposed substitute for the standard of the
reasonable and prudent man. Consequently, there is nothing in the
situation compelling the court to treat this case any differently from
any other malpractice case. That is, the legislature did not establish a
prescribed method of behavior or conduct for any doctor or practitioner,
licensed or unlicensed, to follow when operating on or otherwise dealing
with the person of a patient. The plaintiff could point to no act of the
defendant which was a departure from any set routine of conduct
promulgated by the legislature. Therefore, the common-law standard
of the conduct of a reasonable and prudent man (or doctor) under the
circumstances, no doubt buttressed by expert testimony, must prevail
as the yardstick employed to measure the actionability of the defendant's
conduct.
For instance, suppose that New York had a criminal statute making
it a misdemeanor for any doctor to use on the person of any patient
a hypodermic needle that had not been sterilized in a certain specific
way. If a doctor nevertheless violates this statute and his patient is
infected as a result, then the doctor is automatically negligent. There
is no occasion to consult a jury on this point or to regard the breach of
statute as evidence of negligence. It is negligence because, it is a departure from an officially established course of conduct. And no matter
how good a story the doctor tells at the trial in extenuation of what
he did,2 it would be incorrect to permit the jury to conclude that the
doctor had behaved reasonably under the circumstances and was not
negligent. This is because the statute in question deals with specific
human conduct, branding the departure from a stipulated method of
procedure as substandard. Where this standard is set by the legislature,
it would be folly to permit a common jury to create the competing
standard, which would be implicit in its verdict, to the effect that the
doctor had not been negligent in having failed to come up to the mark
fixed in the statute.
Of course, the temptation is overwhelming to say that a licensing statute of the sort under discussion above is designed to keep the unskilled
21 Of course, a good thing can be carried too far. As to the mitigating effects of
extenuating circumstances, even where there is a breach of a safety statute, see Morris,
The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoL. L. REV. 21 (1949); and see
Notes and Comments, [1942] Wis. L. REv. 422.
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and incompetent from posing and practicing as doctors. Hence, if it is
obeyed, then the individual members of the public who are potential
patients are, to that extent, protected from the unskillfulness and incompetence of those who could not (or at least did not) pass the examination required to secure the license. Moreover, if the particular defendant
in Brown v. Shyne had not violated the New York statute, then the
plaintiff would not have been hurt, as she was."2 But there is still no
apparent logical connection between the breach of this statute and the
harm to the plaintiff! Defendant may have been ineligible to take the
licensing examination because of, say, lack of citizenship or state residence requirements; yet he may still be a competent doctor and have
practiced prudently in dealing with the plaintiff. As far as the statute
is concerned, and on the basis of what is actually known about the way
in which the defendant practiced on the plaintiff on any particular day,
there is no more logical connection between the breach of statute and
the plaintiff's damage than there is between the defendant's having or
not having gotten out of bed on that day. Had he stayed in bed on
each day he practiced on the plaintiff, instead of going to his office, he
would not even have seen the plaintiff and thus could have done her no
harm. In other words, he did nothing whatsoever in dealing with the
plaintiff which was defined and described in the statute as the correct
and standard method of procedure. To be sure, he practiced on her in
violation of the statute. But that does not mean that he did so in any
less skillful or competent a manner than a duly licensed doctor would
have done.
To hold otherwise, and to allow breach of the licensing statute to
be considered as a factor in establishing a case of malpractice against
the defendant, is to add a penalty to the statute which the legislature
did not see fit to include. Because the legislature set no standard of
conduct in the act, with which the common-law standard would invidiously compete if it were employed by the trial court, there is no reason
at all for permitting the breach of this statute to play any part in a
civil action for damages-and every reason why it should not do so.
Indeed, the very fact that the trial court in Brown v. Shyne instructed
the jury that breach of the licensing statute would be some evidence
of negligence only, and not negligence per se, is significant. For if breach
of this statute were germane at all in this action, then it should properly
22 For a spirited defense of the position adopted by judge Crane in Brown v. Shyne,
see Notes & Comments, 22 CoRNELL L. Q. 276 (1937), noting the case of Hardy v. Dahli,
210 N. C. 530, 187 S. E. 788 (1936), in which the North Carolina court held that breach
of a licensing statute by a doctor was not to be regarded as evidence of negligence.
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be conclusive on the issue of negligence, establishing it as a matter
beyond doubt and leaving nothing to the conjecture of the jury. It is
possible that the trial judge sensed this discrepancy and tried to compromise the matter by the intermediate position which he took. But,
to repeat, this was a bad thing to do because criminal statutes should
play absolutely no part in civil litigation unless it is absolutely unavoidable, either because the legislature has specifically provided for civil
liability or because it has promulgated a specific standard of conducta correct way of doing a particular thing-which the court simply cannot ignore in the case before it.
IV.
Perhaps the whole point of this discussion will appear more obvious
in connection with statutes making it a criminal offense to drive a car
without a license and not providing any civil responsibility therefor on
the occasion of damages& Let us assume two typical fact situations.
Suppose defendant is driving a car and collides with the plaintiff, the facts
revealing that defendant at the time did not have a license to drive in
violation of a statute making such circumstance a criminal offense. Or
suppose, on the other hand, that the plaintiff is the one who is unlicensed
to drive at the time of the collision. In the first situation the defendant's
liability to plaintiff depends on proof of his negligence; and it would
seem ridiculous to permit the plaintiff to establish the defendant's negligence on the basis of his having violated the licensing statute. In the
second situation (assuming that the defendant there was negligent) it
would be equally absurd to deny recovery to the otherwise non-negligent
plaintiff on the basis of his having violated the licensing statute. The
reason for the stated conclusion in each case is that a licensing statute
is not a safety statute and, therefore, is not the kind of statute the
breach of which amounts to negligence per se. It does not specify the
standard or correct way to do anything; while driving without a license
does not signify in any conceivable way that at the time in question
such driving did not come up to the approved standard in any respect.
This is true because a licensing statute does not stipulate what standard
23 For a number of fairly recent authorities on this matter, see 26 TFxAs L. REv. 824
(1948); 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 75 (1948); 12 So. CAnI. L. REv. 497 (1939) and 11 Oan. L.
REv. 206 (1932).

See also Straudt v. Cannon, 29 Cal. App. 2d 509, 85 P. 2d 160 (1939);

Aycock v. Peaslee G. P. & V. Co., 60 Ga. App. 897, 5 S. E. 2d 598 (1939); Humbert v.
Lowden, 323 IR. App. 557, 56 N. E. 2d 323 (1944); Ruckman v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
230 Iowa 1144, 300 N. W. 320 (1941) ; Davis v. Simpson, 138 Me. 137, 23 A. 2d 320 (1942) ;
Mahowald v. Bechrich, 212 Minn. 78, 2 N. W. 2d 569 (1942); Renner v. Martin, 116
N. J. L. 240, 183 Atl. 185 (1936); and Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C.
692, 40 S. E. 2d 345 (1947).
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conduct on the road should be, so that breach of the licensing statute
(i.e., not having a license) is tantamount to not having observed the
statutory standard of conduct in driving. An unlicensed driver may be
a superb driver; and whether he is or not, he may have driven with
due care on the occasion in question. Certainly his not having a license
at the time is hardly probative of his not having done so.
Suppose on the other hand that a motorist violates a statute requiring
a full stop when entering an arterial highway from a side road; or
suppose he violates a statute specifying 45 miles per hour as the maximum speed on a certain stretch of highway. No matter how skillfully
he has otherwise handled his car, he has fallen short of official statutory rules of conduct and to that extent is automatically negligent.
harm arising out of risks which these statutes
If he becomes involved -in
were designed to prevent, then he is either liable or is denied recovery,
whatever the case may be. The fact that his conduct might not have
been regarded as negligent in the absence of these statutes is immaterial.
These statutes deal with specific conduct and prescribe how it must be
performed. Any deviation therefrom is substandard; and a jury must
not be permitted to hold otherwise. These statutes actually deal in
terms of observable human conduct and tell how it must or must not
be done, whereas a licensing statute does not do this at all. Incidentally,
it is apparent that the motorist in question would be held automatically
negligent for the breach of these statutes whether or not he carried in
his pocket a license to drive. It is equally clear that a licensed driver
might as easily be guilty of ordinary negligence in the absence of statutory standards of good driving; for his having a license certainly cannot
be accepted as having any probative value indicating that he was not
negligent under any particular circumstances.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held in Johnson v. Boston
& Maine Ry.,2 4 that breach of a licensing statute is contributory negligence preventing recovery of damages by a motorist against a railroad
which negligently caused him damage. The particular licensing statute
did not include a provision imposing civil responsibility for its breach,
either in the shape of liability for damages caused or by way of subjecting the violator to the defense of contributory negligence. In spite
of the fact that such a general licensing statute does not lay down a
standard of conduct which a court could not very well ignore in negligence litigation, the New Hampshire Court held that it did. Thus it
said: "The legislature laid down a rule of conduct. It has not said
merely that whoever drives without a license shall be punished. . ..
24 83 N. H. 350, 143 AftI. 516 (1928).
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In addition to that provision it has enacted another, specifically forbidding the act of driving. .

.

.It did this to protect lawful travellers."

The court then went on to observe: "The reason for this prohibition
is that driving by the unfit is dangerous." After pointing out that the
statute does not prohibit unlicensed driving "because the party does not
have a certain paper in his pocket, or because he had not paid the state
two dollars," the court remarked: "He is classed with the unfit because
he has not taken the prescribed method to establish his fitness in advance." And adverting to the handling of this issue in other jurisdictions the court added: "Because an unlicensed driver was in fact
competent, or might be so, it has been held that the prohibition might
be disregarded, upon the ground that the violation was not causal. This
amounts to substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature in fixing the line between legal and illegal conduct." Conceding
that frequently the unlicensed driver is as fit as the licensed, the court
declared that the legislature had acted to keep the unfit off the road
and said: "There is no other practical way to accomplish the desired
result. The fit can protect themselves by procuring a license. If they
do not, they cannot complain of being classed with the unfit."
In the writer's humble opinion, the New Hampshire Court's treatment of this matter was utterly inadequate and unrealistic, betraying
an almost complete ignorance of the role of criminal statutes in civil
litigation. Suppose the New Hampshire legislature imposes a fine of,
say, $25 for driving on its highways without a license. Then assuming
that the plaintiff in the case just discussed had not actually driven
negligently and that the defendant railroad was negligent, if his damages
were $10,000, the plaintiff has been fined $10,000 for violating this
statute and is still subject to the further fine of $25. And this, when
all the evidence indicates that the plaintiff was driving carefully and
was violating no "rule of conduct" in the nature of a "standard of
care" set down by the legislature! If a statute had made it a misdemeanor for a motorist not to stop, look and listen at a railroad crossing
and the plaintiff had violated that statute when he was hurt, then it
would be correct to deny him recovery, regardless of the railroad's
negligence, if the evidence indicated a causal relationship between nonobservance of the statute and the plaintiff's harm.2 5 Otherwise we would
25 I assume, of course, that there always has to be some real causal relationship between
the breach of a safety statute and the harm-just as there must be such a relationship
between ordinary negligence and the harm complained of-in order for the violator of the
statute to be civilly responsible as negligent per se, either for damages as a defendant or
defensively, as a plaintiff. But I might add that I think any talk of causal connection
or its absence between breach of a licensing statute and the damage in suit seems ex-
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get involved in pitting the plaintiff's and the jury's judgment of what
would be prudent conduct under the circumstances against that of the
legislature's; and the inference that the standard of prudent conduct
established by the legislature must prevail in the civil litigation ensuing
breach of the statute is overwhelming. Moreover, to proceed in this
fashion on the basis of breach of a licensing statute, which does not
establish any rule of conduct in the nature of a standard of care (in
the sense that it stipulates how certain aspects of the act of driving a
car should or should not be done), seems absurd and illogical on the
basis of any understandable premises. The New Hampshire court's
declaration that "There is no other practical way to accomplish the
desired result" is an utter non sequitur; for the legislature could increase
the size of the fine for breach of the licensing statute and, if it saw fit,
could even expressly impose civil responsibility for its breachl But until
it goes that far, no court should anticipate that result on the basis of
breach of a licensing statute.
While it is not altogether clear, the New Hampshire legislature in
1937 apparently took this same point of view, adding to the statute in
question the following clause: "and if any person shall operate a motor
vehicle in violation of this section such violation in any civil action shall
be prima facie evidence of his unfitness to operate a motor vehicle. ' 26
Anyway, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted this new
language to mean that the lack of an operator's license was no longer
"causal in the strictest sense" of any accident in which the unlicensed
driver was involved, regarding it rather as a mandate to inquire into
the driver's actual fitness to drive. 7 Under this new view, lack of a
license would merely operate as a presumption of unfitness, rebuttable
by evidence to the contrary. Of course, this in effect makes absence of
a license probative to some extent of the driver's unfitness, which in
turn might also affect the chances of an unlicensed driver's attempt to
convince a jury that he was free from negligence. While this result,
even as indirect as it is, runs counter to the conviction that breach of
a licensing statute should play no part at all in civil litigation because
it sets no standard of care governing particular human conduct, still it
tremely out of place and utterly inappropriate. See Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295,
190 N. E. 521 (1934), with which compare the "causation" analysis in Falk v. Finkelman,
268 Mass. 524, 168 N. E. 89 (1929), to indicate what I mean. The correct analysis of
such cases obviates any need for the mention of causation at all.
26 N. H. Rev. Laws c. 117, § 9 (1942).
27 Mandell v. Dodge-Friedman Poultry Co., 94 N. H. 1, 45 A. 2d 577 (1946). For a
fairly complete account of the New Hampshire development, see 163 A. L. R. 1370, at
1384-6 and 1391-2.
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must be conceded that such result is due to an express legislative provision inserted in the criminal statute and is not due to a purely judicial
interpolation.
V.
In Massachusetts it has long been the law that drivers of unregistered
automobiles are, without more, liable for harm they cause and are unable to recover for harm they sustain. This result was not due to any
express language in the statute requiring cars to be registered but was
a matter entirely of judicial interpolation. The theory underlying this
view was that a person driving an unregistered car is a trespasser on
the highway; and his liability for damages or inability to recover was
originally governed by analogy to the plight of one who violated the
Lord's Day Act of that state.2 8 Back in 1909, when this notion was
first perpetrated in Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co.. 9 it was
certainly indefensible under prevailing views, since the principles governing the proper role of violations of criminal statutes in civil litigation
had long been established. Nevertheless, a Connecticut motorist, driving
a car registered in that state, was denied recovery for damages sustained
when his automobile was struck by a trolley-car in Massachusetts,
because at the time of the collision he had overstayed by two days
the fifteen-day visitor's privilege accorded to out-of-state vehicle owners.
It is true that the plaintiff in that case had violated the criminal law of
Massachusetts when he remained there after fifteen days, without having
registered his car in that state. But it is equally true that had he begun
his vacation a couple of days later, he would not have been held guilty of
contributory fault barring his recovery of damages.
It is hard to perceive how breach of this criminal statute could have
anything to do with civil liability or contributory fault barring recovery.
Apparently the Massachusetts court took the position that if the registration statute was observed, then those who were improperly registered
would not be on the highways, and to that extent the roads would be
freer of obstructions. In short, had the plaintiff in the above case gone
back to Connecticut when his fifteen days ran out, he would not have
been in Northampton to be struck by the defendant's trolley-car. There
is, of course, a certain amount of crude reason in this observation, just
as there is in the view that one who travels on Sunday, in violation
of a Lord's Day statute, would not have been hurt if he had been in
church at the time or had not left his house at all. But some state
28 See MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 136 (1949) and the various older statutes referred to following some of the sections thereof, going back to as early as 1692.
29 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25 (1909).
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courts have taken what is generally regarded as the more rational view
that respect for the Lord, if it has to be imposed by law at all, is adequately taken care of by fines or other punishments.3 ° Apparently the
Massachusetts court's view of retribution for such offenders was that
it served them right if they got hurt while travelling on Sunday-an
attitude which seems most un-Christian and which betrays a lack of
faith in the legislature's sanctions prescribed in the statute.
Actually, where Sunday laws prevailed, it might seriously be maintained that the presence of offenders on the streets would not be contemplated at all on that day. But the registration laws could not possibly be so construed, for all cars are welcomed on the highways of
Massachusetts if they are properly registered. Under the statute involved in the Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co. case, supra, the
visitor from Connecticut was welcome and expected at any time--for
fifteen days without, and any length of time with, local registration.
Had he come two days later or had he registered his car locally, his
place on the streets of Northampton would have been secured and
respected. As it was, he incurred a fine by being there on the day in
question. But if the legislature had seen fit to impose only a fine for
the visitor's unprivileged use of the state's highways, it is hard to appreciate the occasion for the deprivation by the court of his civil rights
as well or for increasing his fine a hundred fold or more in the teeth
of express legislation.
By now, of course, this original aberration has become so enmeshed
with statutory developments in Massachusetts, having to do with compulsory liability insurance and submission by outsiders to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts, that it has virtually acquired the express
sanction of its legislature.3 At the same time the Massachusetts court
has pursued the idea that breach of the statute requiring operators of
cars to have currently valid driving licenses is evidence of negligence,
and then only when it is shown to have been a causative factor in contributing to the harm in suit, whatever that qualification means. Thus,
in effect, violation of the Massachusetts registration act amounts to
negligence per se, while violation of the statute requiring an operator's
license is only evidence of negligence.3 2 Actually, the Massachusetts
cases involving breaches of the registration acts do not seem like negligence cases at all. For the imposition of liability on defendants, and
3O See PROSSER, TORTS 266 (1941).
31 See annotation in 163 A. L. R. 1370, at 1375 et seq.
32 Kenyon v. Hathaway, 274 Mass. 47, 174 N. E. 463 (1931); Peabody v. Campbell,
286 Mass. 295, 190 N. E. 521 (1934); Keeler v. Godfrey, 308 Mass. 573, 33 N. E. 2d 265
(1941).
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the denial of recovery by plaintiffs, who were in violation of the registration law, are not purported by the Massachusetts court to have any
rational connection with the law governing the administration of losses
caused inadvertently by motorists. It is, rather, as if a defendant :Vere
required to pay a stiff judgment because, when he was interviewed at
the time of the accident, he was discovered to have been in default of
payment of his real property taxes; or as if a plaintiff under similar
circumstances were denied recovery because it transpired that he was
an alien illegally overstaying his leave on a student visa from England
or that he had played bridge for money the previous gaturday night.
While the Massachusetts court also seems clearly wrong in regarding
breach of the statute requiring a valid operator's license as evidence of
negligence, at least one can perceive a crude method in its error and
understand what it is groping for, somewhat as an intuitive parent can
divine the inarticulate grunts of an infant.
It has always seemed odd that Thayer, in his classic essay,3s did not
take the Massachusetts court to task for having embarked on this twofold heresy. He wrote this essay shortly after the court had taken the
first steps in that direction. While he was certainly aware of this development and vaguely cast aspersions on it, he completely neglected to
attack it in its most vulnerable spot. That is, since the registration and
licensing statutes were not safety laws, and did not prescribe standards
of human conduct involved in the actual driving of cars, then (unless
the legislature had expressly provided otherwise) the violation of these
criminal statutes could play no rational part in administering the law
governing compensation for inadvertently caused harm-the law of
negligence. For the only rational part such violation could play would
be to indicate departure from the officially approved standard of care
up to which the parties litigant were supposed to come. If the statutes
do not set such standards at all and do not even purport to govern the
immediate act of driving a car or to set rules for an automobile's progress
on the roads, then their breach has no part whatsoever in civil litigation.
It is difficult to tell whether Thayer ever pushed his thesis to this point.
He certainly did not do so in his leading essay in the general field. And
while a good deal of the criticism made by Professor Lowndes of
Thayer's essay3 4 is valid, I strongly dissent from most of what he himself has to say on this subject.
33 Thayer, supra note 5.
3 Lowndes, supra note S.
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VI.

Every year a substantial number of torts students seem to believe
that breach of a licensing statute should be regarded as tantamount to
liability-negligence per se, if you will-although many of them would
settle for its being simply evidence of negligence. They seem to see
some necessary and logical connection between not having a license,
which is granted only on the basis of certain examinations, and inability
to engage competently in the field of activity which can lawfully be
pursued only by duly licensed people. But only in one respect do these
students seem to have a valid argument-and even that is refutable.
Suppose, they say, that it is impossible to secure a driving license without taking certain tests, one of which is an eye test. If the applicant
fails to come up to a certain standard of vision without glasses, he is
requited to get glasses and to wear them at all times he is driving the
car. Now, suppose X drives without a license and, in connection with
civil litigation, it transpires that X's vision is substandard according
to the test prescribed in securing a license. Also assume that the factor
of vision was one of the pertinent elements involved in the litigation.
Here, it is said, is a licensing statute that actually sets a standard of
care; and if it appears that X had ignored this standard of care by violating the statute, then that is negligence on X's part. However, this
conclusion follows only if it also appears that X's vision was faulty and
that he was not wearing glasses at the time of the accident. For if X's
vision without glasses was up to the standard set by the legislature,
then breach of the statute is irrelevant. The same would be true of the
unlicensed driver even if his vision were substandard, if at the same
time it appeared that he was wearing glasses when the accident occurred.
In other words, it is conceded that a licensing statute can include a
provision which, to a limited extent, also makes it in part a safety
statute. But, to the extent that it is a safety statute, setting a standard
of conduct, a failure to have a license as required by law is not, in itself,
proof that the stipulated standard of conduct was not observed. That
can be shown in this particular case only if X's vision were actually
substandard and, at the same time, he was not wearing corrective
glasses when the accident occurred. Hence this illustration does not
seriously affect the main thesis in this essay. On the other hand, if the
legislature made it a criminal offense to drive into the sun without
wearing smoked or tinted glasses, then it would seem that non-observance
of that law should be treated as negligence in itself in civil litigation.
The fact remains that licensing and registration acts do not set
standards of care. Hence, their breach should not play any part what-
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soever in civil litigation, unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise. For nobody can adequately support the proposition that unlicensed operators and doctors are automatically unfit because they are
unlicensed or that they operated negligently or unskillfully at any
particular time for that reason. Nor can -there be shown any logical
and compelling argument to the effect that such a breach of a licensing
statute under such circumstances is even evidence of negligent operation at any particular time. Too many of us know as a practical matter
that there is no compelling logical connection.
State legislatures are always free to impose civil responsibility for
breach of criminal statutes when, as and if they wish to do so, as long
as they remain within the vague boundaries of our state and federal
constitutions. If there are any doubts in this general field-doubts which
this article has shown do exist-a sound rule of thumb for our courts
to follow is to avoid placing any importance whatsoever on breaches of
criminal statutes in civil litigation. They should do so, as pointed out
above, only when the legislature has expressly said they must or when
they cannot avoid doing so, without compromising the settled principles
of the common law of negligence by letting a jury compete with the
legislature's evaluation and official standard governing specific human
conduct.

